eu

This week the OECD has a once-in-a-decade chance to stop funding oil and gas — it’s time to step up

This week the OECD has a once-in-a-decade chance to stop funding oil and gas — it’s time to step up

By Sandrine Dixson-Declève, co-president of The Club of Rome and co-lead of the Earth4All initiative

07 November 2023 — This week, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is meeting in Paris for its annual forum. On the negotiating table is a once-in-a-decade opportunity to end the flow of public money into fossil fuels, but you’d be forgiven for not knowing about it.

The OECD is made up of a group of primarily wealthy countries, who collectively set their own standards around big global issues like tax, trade and the environment. Despite being one of the world’s most influential trade bodies, decisions at the OECD often happen behind closed doors. Members say that this allows them to get on with ‘building better policies for better lives‘ without distraction. The problem is that channelling billions of dollars of public money into fossil fuels each year doesn’t square with that aim.

https://www.clubofrome.org/blog-post/stop-funding-oil/

Should Israeli flags adorn EU Buildings?

Israeli flags adorn EU buildings after Hamas attacks. Is the bloc united? | Israel-Palestine conflict News

“I was shocked. Especially when I saw [the Israeli flag] on the EU Parliament building. It’s the house of democratically elected representatives of Europe, many of whom do not simply ‘stand with Israel’.

“I was also shocked at how quickly the EU institutions put up the flags, I think it was even faster than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Considering the incredibly complex situation of Israel and Palestine, I think this rapid step is incredibly irresponsible.”

(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/israeli-flags-adorn-eu-buildings-after-hamas-attacks-is-the-bloc-united)

Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas

Executive Summary

The main finding of this paper is that there is limited scope for significantly reducing overall European dependence on Russian gas before the mid-2020s.

However, countries in the Baltic region and south-eastern Europe which are highly dependent on Russian gas, and hence extremely vulnerable to interruptions, could substantially reduce and even eliminate imports of Russian gas by the early 2020s, by a combination of LNG supplies and pipeline gas from Azerbaijan. Similar measures could reduce (but not eliminate) the dependence of central Europe and Turkey on Russian gas. In the majority of countries, there is limited scope to reduce gas with oil products, and to the extent that it is replaced by coal in power generation carbon emissions will increase significantly.

Up to the mid-2020s, European companies are contractually obliged to import at least 115 bcm/year of Russian gas (approximately 75 per cent of the 2013 import level), a figure which reduces to around 65 bcm by 2030. Even if long-term contracts disappear, our modelling shows a requirement of at least 100 bcm/year of Russian gas up to 2030, and in some scenarios up to twice that volume. The main additional source of non-Russian gas for Europe up to 2030 will be LNG; pipeline gas imports from domestic and other imported sources are not envisaged to increase substantially and may decline. Russian gas deliveries to Europe will be highly competitive with all other pipeline gas and LNG (including US LNG) supplies throughout the period to 2030, and Gazprom's market power to impact European hub prices may be considerable.

Countries with strong geopolitical fears related to Russian gas dependence will need to either terminate, or not renew on expiry, their long-term contracts with Gazprom. This will result in substantial additional infrastructure costs for LNG import terminals and pipeline connections, or investments in alternative energy sources, energy conservation, and efficiency measures.

Whatever the political relationship between Russia, the European Union, and individual European countries, a continued natural gas relationship will be necessary and needs to be carefully managed. The most immediate problems are: a resolution of the Ukrainian transit situation, and a successful conclusion of the EU's regulatory treatment of the South Stream pipeline. Once the immediate crisis has passed, both sides need to discuss the future role of gas in EU energy balances, together with its potential contribution to the EU's ambitious carbon reduction targets. Download PDF