Abstract

This paper examines the interconnected relationship between Pentagon procurement policies, the defense industrial complex, and the perpetuation of global military conflicts, including the release by the Washington Post on December 17 th 2017 of David Fravor’s encounter with an unknown aircraft (UAP/UFO) https://wapo.st/4qTC7KJ

Drawing on recent data from 2020–2026, the analysis show defense contractors have consolidated extraordinary economic power, receiving over $771 billion from the Pentagon’s top five firms alone during 2020–2024[1]. The research argues that institutional incentives embedded within the military-industrial complex create structural pressures toward conflict escalation, arms race acceleration, and the erosion of diplomatic alternatives. As nuclear arms control regimes collapse and emerging technologies blur conventional-nuclear boundaries, the mechanisms driving this system pose unprecedented risks to global security. This is particularly relevant given that the United States, the UK and the French governments have announced that UAP’s are a real phenomena and are being seen on a regular basis in our atmosphere.

Introduction

President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1961 warning about the “military-industrial complex” has materialized into a self-perpetuating system where economic interests, bureaucratic imperatives, and geopolitical strategy have become inseparable [2]. The Pentagon’s $886 billion budget for fiscal year 2025 represents not merely defense spending but the lifeblood of an industrial ecosystem dependent on perpetual conflict preparation [3]. This paper analyzes how this structure generates momentum toward military engagement independent of genuine security requirements.

The Concentration of Defense Contracting Power

Between 2020 and 2024, five corporations—Lockheed Martin ($313 billion), RTX ($145 billion), General Dynamics ($116 billion), Boeing ($115 billion), and Northrop Grumman ($81 billion)—captured $771 billion in Pentagon contracts [1]. This concentration represents more than double the entire U.S. diplomacy, development, and humanitarian aid budget of $356 billion during the same period [1]. Over two decades of post-9/11 conflicts, these same five contractors accumulated $2 trillion in government contracts, creating structural dependencies that transcend administrations and political cycles [1].

The profitability model of these firms depends directly on sustained conflict and threat perception. Ukraine and Middle East conflicts generated surging profits for Lockheed Martin and RTX in 2025, with missiles, munitions, and air defense systems identified as primary revenue drivers [3]. Lockheed Martin’s $12.5 billion contract for 296 F-35 aircraft exemplifies how prolonged conflicts translate directly into corporate revenues 3]. The Pentagon has ordered suppliers to “double or even quadruple” missile production on “breakneck” schedules, further entrenching industrial capacity designed for warfare rather than peace [4].

Institutional Mechanisms Driving Conflict

The military-industrial complex operates through multiple reinforcing mechanisms that bias policy toward militarized solutions. First, the revolving door between Pentagon leadership and defense contractors creates institutional capture, where procurement decisions reflect corporate interests rather than strategic necessity [2]. Second, congressional districts hosting defense manufacturing facilities create political constituencies dependent on military spending, making budget reductions politically untenable regardless of security requirements [2].

Third, threat inflation serves as the ideological justification for expanding arsenals. The characterization of China’s nuclear expansion, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and North Korea’s growing arsenal creates a “complexity of deterrence” narrative that demands everincreasing military capabilities [5]. Yet this framing obscures how arms buildups themselves drive adversarial responses, creating the very threats they purport to address. The erosion of nuclear arms control—including the February 2026 expiration of New START—results partly from the absence of alternative frameworks when military expansion becomes institutionally embedded [6][7].

The Global Arms Race Acceleration

The contemporary arms race extends beyond nuclear weapons to encompass hypersonic missiles, autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence applications, and space-based capabilities [5]. China’s nuclear arsenal trajectory could match U.S. and Russian ICBM quantities by decade’s end, while both Washington and Moscow plan to expand deployed warheads as arms control expires [6][7]. Emerging technologies blur conventional-nuclear boundaries, creating faster escalation dynamics and heightened miscalculation risks [5].

Arms sales further globalize this dynamic. The Trump administration’s approval of $15.7 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Israel in January 2026, including 30 Apache helicopters to Israel, illustrates how U.S. policy actively fuels regional conflicts [8]. Record arms transfers during 2020–2025 boosted weapons firms’ bottom lines by tens of billions of dollars, creating economic incentives for perpetuating instability in conflict zones [1][3].

Economic Conversion and Alternative Pathways

The structural entrenchment of the military-industrial complex raises fundamental questions about the possibility of redirection. Direct arms-industry employment in the United Kingdom declined from over 400,000 in the early 1980s to 134,000 by 2022–2023, demonstrating that industrial transformation is feasible [9]. However, successful economic conversion requires deliberate policy frameworks that provide alternative employment for defense workers, redirect research and development toward civilian applications, and restructure procurement priorities. The allocation of $771 billion to five defense contractors versus $356 billion for diplomacy and development reveals profoundly distorted priorities [1]. Strengthening the defense industrial base—estimated at $75 billion in the Pentagon’s 2025 request—perpetuates overcapacity rather than addressing genuine vulnerabilities [10]. Alternative security strategies emphasizing diplomacy, conflict prevention, and multilateral cooperation remain chronically underfunded, ensuring that militarized responses dominate policy options.

Conclusion

The Pentagon-arms manufacturer nexus operates as a self-fulfilling system where institutional incentives, economic dependencies, and bureaucratic imperatives generate momentum toward perpetual conflict preparation and arms race acceleration [2]. The concentration of $2 trillion among five contractors over two decades, the systematic underfunding of diplomatic alternatives, and the erosion of arms control regimes demonstrates how this structure overrides strategic rationality. As nuclear risks intensify and emerging technologies compress decision timelines, the costs of maintaining this system threaten catastrophic consequences. Breaking this cycle requires not merely budgetary adjustments but fundamental restructuring of the institutional relationships that privilege military solutions over diplomatic engagement. Without such transformation, the logic of the military-industrial complex will continue driving conflicts that serve corporate profitability rather than genuine security.

References

[1] Hartung, W. D., & Semler, J. (2025, July 7). Profits of War: Top Beneficiaries of Pentagon Spending, 2020–2024. Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. https://quincyinst.org/research/profits-of-war-top-beneficiaries-of-pentagon-spending2020-2024/

[2] Freeman, B. (2025, December 18). Trillions for War, Pennies for People: How Soaring Military Spending Fails America. Institute for New Economic Thinking. https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/trillions-for-war-pennies-for-peoplehow-soaring-military-spending-fails-america

[3] Reuters. (2025, October 21). Ukraine and Middle East conflicts boost U.S. arms makers profits. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-middle-eastconflicts-boost-us-arms-makers-profits-2025-10-21/

[4] Pentagon orders arms makers to ‘quadruple’ missile production. (2025, September 28). The Cradle. https://thecradle.co/articles-id/33413

[5] CSIS. (2025, November 17). Strategic Trends 2025. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-trends-2025

[6] SIPRI. (2025, June 15). Nuclear risks grow as new arms race looms—new SIPRI Yearbook out now. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/nuclear-risks-grow-new-arms-race-loomsnew-sipri-yearbook-out-now

[7] Chatham House. (2025, December 11). Global security continued to unravel in 2025. Crucial tests are coming in 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/12/global-securitycontinued-unravel-2025-crucial-tests-are-coming-2