ASLAN KAMERA

 

We can talk about that if you’d like. But I think the bottom line is this is the beginning, not the end. Maybe it’s the end of the beginning of the new long war. Because I see no evidence that the Israelis will accept anything other than total destruction of Iran if necessary or, for that matter, of anybody else in the region that challenges them. And there is no end to what’s happening in Gaza. Every day I try to tune in and find out the state of these ceasefire talks, and I still see an impasse between Hamas and Israel.

Israel wants no end to the destruction. They’ll take a 60-day ceasefire and take hostages back, but then they want to resume the war. Hamas doesn’t want to resume the war. It’s no surprise in that. I think we would like to see this thing end obviously in Washington, but Israel is really in charge, not us. I think that’s the other thing that we need to come to terms with: President Trump is profoundly influenced and shaped in his thinking and behavior by the Israel lobby.

Absolutely. Without question. Colonel, if you go back to October 7th and look at the situation until now, from a military standpoint, is it overall fairly impressive that Israel was able to neutralize, to a certain extent, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthies, as well as Iran, in the course of less than a two-year period? Now that we see Syria with a new president and that region potentially shifting a little, can this turn into a major victory for peace in that region? I know those are two separate questions, but you know, I don’t think anybody saw Israel coming back so quickly and those forces, like Hezbollah and Iran, that seemed unstoppable, basically being on pause temporarily. Did that impress you or surprise you as a strategist?

I’m a little surprised that Iran accepted the ceasefire. If they had kept it up for another week, that would have been the end of Israel. So, we need to keep that in mind. No doubt Moscow and Beijing both advised the Iranians to accept the ceasefire. Now, we’ll see if that was a prudent decision for them over the weeks ahead. I think we need to understand that Israel had finally struck what I would call granite and could not advance any further, risking being destroyed by Iran.

Of course, that leaves open the possibility that, under those circumstances, Israelis would have announced they were going to use a nuclear weapon because they’ve always threatened that behind the scenes. They certainly did in 1973, and I see no evidence that they would not have done that since. It was always the United States that intervened and said fine, we know you have that, do not use it. I don’t think that restraint exists anymore. I don’t think we have that kind of influence over them; their influence over us seems greater.

As far as the other issues are concerned, they have not gone; they still exist. If anything, they’re rearming. I do not think that you could regard Lebanon, even though Israel did a great deal of damage there, as a foregone conclusion. If I were to point to an area where they’ve had significant success—without the assistance of others—it’s Syria. They managed to replace the government in Syria of Mr. Assad, which they’ve wanted to get rid of for years due to his friendly relations with Iran and other reasons.

Now, we have the former deputy head of Al-Qaeda and a deputy head of ISIS who has become president of this new Syrian Republic, if you want to dignify it with that name. They’re killing Christians on a routine basis. They went into a church just the other day and killed half the people in it and burned it down. That was just a suicide bomber, right? I don’t think that was government sanctioned.

I don’t think it was a rogue attack. I think we’re dealing with a very vicious and dangerous regime in Syria, which is backed by Mr. Erdogan. But then again, Mr. Erdogan and the Turks actually helped to establish ISIS to begin with. Remember that ISIS was really designed to do one thing: kill Shiites in Iraq. It was not meant to wander all over the map and kill anybody that got in its way. I think that focus is now more present in Syria, where Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Netanyahu have a condo of interest, if they can focus Syria and the thugs in Syria on killing Shiites in Iraq.

That’s a vital area for Mr. Erdogan right now because he is also concerned about the emergence of a Kurdish state, which is a potential in Syria and northern Iraq. If there’s one thing that aggravates him, perhaps more than anything else at this stage, it’s the possibility that those Kurds could come together. We, including MI6 and the CIA, have worked very closely with the Kurds, so this is a touchy area for Mr. Erdogan.

Simultaneously, we’ve worked very hard with Mr. Erdogan to unseat Assad and his government. So, I think we have to understand that this was a success, but do you think that was a success? Well, it depends on how you view it. I don’t see anything particularly socially, culturally, or politically redeeming about the government in Syria. I think, at some point, Mr. Erdogan will regret what he’s done because he and the Turkish military may ultimately have to go in there. Syria is by no stretch of the imagination, in my judgment, permanently stable or a status quo member of the region.

However, the Sunni Islamists are very happy with it for the reasons I’ve outlined. Mr. Netanyahu is happy with it, and I don’t think Mr. Netanyahu will have too much trouble with Mr. Erdogan, provided that Mr. Netanyahu and the Israelis stay south of Damascus. Damascus holds great significance in the Islamic world; one of the earliest Turkish sultans is interred there in one of the great mosques. When the Turkish chief of intelligence visited Damascus shortly after the fall of the previous government, he landed at Damascus airport and went instantly to the great mosque to pray.

That was done with great symbolism—first, to signal that we Turks are back and that we are serious, and second, to indicate to Israel not to try to occupy Damascus. How long will this last, Brian? How long did the Nazi-Soviet pact last? It lasted from August of ’39 until June of ’41, which is less than two years. In the Middle East, that’s a blink of an eye. So, we’ll see how long this condominium of interest between Israel and Turkey lasts.

The interesting thing is that I think Israel has gotten at least short-term what it wants in Syria and part of what it wants in Lebanon. The conditions in the Sinai and Egypt, on the other hand, are something else entirely. The Israelis have made threats to the Egyptians because the Egyptians have moved forces to the border with Gaza. Some people say that’s just to keep all the people in Gaza from coming into Egypt, and that’s part of it. However, the population in Egypt is absolutely enraged.

This is the largest Arab country in the world, and they are furious at what the Israelis have been doing—murdering Palestinians by the bushel. Very recently, there was another example in the West Bank, where a whole village of Christian Arabs were driven out of their homes, and some were killed. The Israelis burned down the town. These actions will not endear the Israelis to many people, and that’s why I say this war is not over. It’s just the beginning, and it’s going to go on.

Now, if we can move briefly to the Caucasus, this is much more significant, I think. Trump recently lifted sanctions after meeting with the president in Saudi Arabia, and now we hear rumors that Syria might even sign the Abraham Accords before the end of the year. What do you make of both? Not much, I would say. First of all, the Abraham Accords are anathema to everyone in the Islamic world except the ruling elites in Saudi Arabia and perhaps the Emirates.

The distance today between the populations in the region—among the peninsula Arabs and in North Africa—and their ruling political class is enormous. As long as they can keep the food available and ensure that everyone is paid and enjoys a relatively cushy life, this can continue. But any interruption would be devastating. At this stage, I wouldn’t attach much significance to that. It may be important to President Trump’s donors and the Israel lobby, and it might be good optics temporarily for America and his friends, but it’s not very meaningful.

Regarding the Caucasus, as you know, it links the soft underbelly of Russia to Iran. I’m sure you’ve had people come on and talk about the One Belt, One Road initiative. Recently, one of the first trains made its way all the way from China on the rail lines to offload freight in Iran. This just occurred a few weeks ago. That’s the tip of the proverbial iceberg. The Chinese are not interested in Iran and the One Belt, One Road just because they dream of resurrecting the Silk Road; it’s much more than that.

There’s an organization they worry about constantly, called the United States Navy. And they concern themselves that their ports, because of their long coastline with the Pacific, could suddenly be bottled up. Bottling up their ports would take no more than a handful of submarines. You don’t need a big surface fleet for that anymore; just torpedo or missile someone coming in or out, and everybody stops. They’ve been working tirelessly to build an alternative commercial structure that could move goods and services back and forth across the Eurasian landmass without making them entirely dependent upon the sea.

More recently, as you look at the Persian Gulf, something else has definitely been on Mr. Trump’s mind: the possibility of moving a quarter of the world’s natural gas and oil through the Persian Gulf. He understands the impact that a spike in oil prices would have on inflation. That’s another reason why he seemed very anxious to tie a bow, at least for this phase of the operation. The Chinese depend heavily on that oil and want to circumvent any confrontation related to it.

Alongside this, you have the Russians wanting to develop a line of communication—a north-south route—running from the Indian Ocean all the way up into Russia, with potential connections through Russia and Ukraine into Europe. They have been working on that, supported by the Saudis. Everyone has a vested interest in this, particularly given the problems we saw with the Suez Canal; no one wants to be dependent on that place if they can avoid it.

I think what’s happening in the Caucasus really touches a nerve. Azerbaijan is the Asian face of Turkey. When I say “Asian face,” I mean they’re facing east, north, and south, while Anatolia is more western in its strategic orientation for obvious reasons. Both Ali, who is the president of Azerbaijan, and President Erdogan share a similar dream of a Turkic empire extending all the way across to Kazakhstan.

People in Central Asia, until you reach Mongolia (except for the Tajiks), speak languages that are very close, and they see themselves as “Turk.” You had the Organization of Turkish States, and the two of them have been trying to transform this organization into something more powerful politically, militarily, and economically. It’s kind of a Turkic version of the dream of Genghis Khan, uniting Central Asia with their allies in the Caucasus and Anatolia. However, it hasn’t worked all that well due to the Central Asian republics, which are on extremely good terms with Moscow.

In fact, the leadership there loves Vladimir Putin; they believe he’s the only man they can depend upon in a crisis. Meanwhile, we’ve been working since the late ’70s to destabilize and create unrest in Central Asia. This began with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and continued, getting shot in the arm in ’96 and ’97, led by Brzezinski promoting ways to create instability for both Russia and China. Interestingly, both Russia and China share the same interest in stabilizing Central Asia.

While the Central Asian population may not be particularly enthusiastic about the Chinese, they want to do business with them and are very comfortable with the Russians. Thus, Russia has become the muscle in Central Asia. Someone recently mentioned that it was puzzling to see pallets of cash continuing to be delivered to Kabul after we left Afghanistan. However, this cash seemed meant for sowing subversion in Central Asia.

If you’re sitting in Moscow and examining U.S. actions—whether in the Middle East or through sanctions and tariffs—the discontent it breeds, particularly when we’ve been trying to destabilize areas they hold dear, can create animosity. Putin once suggested to President Obama, “Are you going to put a stop to this? We’d like to see it end.” And while they agreed, it never ended, leading to questions about who ultimately controls the Central Intelligence Agency and its apparatus.

The point is this issue is ongoing. Ali has shown that he is interested not only in annihilating Armenia but has now expressed interest in more than just portions of Armenia. He even mentioned being prepared to send troops into northern Iran to move into areas around Tabriz, which is historically Turkic and Azeri. How seriously should we take this? Well, we should monitor it in the weeks and days ahead. The Russians have certainly taken him very seriously; they recently arrested the head of the Azerbaijani diaspora inside Russia in Yekaterinburg. Moscow has made it very clear that they are not pleased with any attempt to destabilize and break up Iran.

This is pertinent to understand, as we have been attempting to destabilize Russia through Ukraine—overthrowing regimes, breaking up states, and moving in to exploit their resources. That effort failed. Now, Western financial interests in London and New York City, led by Israel and the United States, have shifted their focus toward Iran, particularly its resources. How do you execute this? By breaking the north-south axis of communications, transportation, and cooperation between Russia and Iran, which is the first step in isolating Iran and beginning to dismantle it under a guise of, quote, “liberating” the Turks in northern Iran from Iranian leadership.

I don’t know the current state of the population in northern Iran; perhaps you need to talk to someone more familiar with it. My impression is that the Turks there have been integrated into the larger Iranian structure for a long time, dating back to their time under Persia, and I don’t think they have any grievances that could easily be exploited. However, with Russian interests at play, we might see that their hand may not be as free as they think.

Mr. Erdogan is the western side of this eastern effort and might even be laying low for now. There’s the reality that the Mossad has been operating out of Azerbaijan for some time, launching strikes into Iran from there. We’ll wait and see what action the Russians take, but they’re certainly displeased with that situation. It would be a mistake to assume that Russia will not take steps to stop it. But this matter will not go away; it is part of a larger strategy to regime change Iran and ultimately dismantle it. That’s why I say the war continues—it’s just evolving with different means.

Did those strikes seriously inhibit the Iranian nuclear program? Were they able to get the uranium out beforehand? I heard it is quite movable, and you implied that they gave them notice before they struck. Satellite images show they already rebuilt roads around the main facility just a week later. What do you think the actual state of that program is? It’s one thing to have nuclear capacity and another to be able to arm it on a warhead. What do you think the status is, aside from all the media coverage we hear?

I think that’s an important caveat you mentioned at the end. First of all, I’m not privy to whatever intelligence tells us. Through many years of military service, I’ve learned that intelligence tends to align with what the boss wants. Often, the information filtered to the top is shaped to fit that narrative. We’ve heard Mr. Netanyahu claim for two months, two weeks, or even two days, that Iran is two hours from a nuclear weapon since 1995. I’m very skeptical of that narrative.

People I trust who have insight into Iran and access to sensitive intelligence suggest there’s no effort to build a bomb. I tend to think that’s true. The question remains: What about the installations we bombed? Was there anything left? Ted Postol, who knows a great deal about this, mentioned that the enriched uranium was likely removed since we did not detect any radiation release, which typically occurs if you successfully destroy a facility containing plutonium.

There’s an accumulation of evidence suggesting that not only was the material moved but they may have relocated some centrifuges along with the uranium to unknown locations. The Iranians recognized that the IAEA functioned as an intelligence collection agency for the Mossad, so I doubt we’ll see the IAEA return to the scene. Therefore, I don’t believe this is the end at all. President Trump seems to think we didn’t even kill anyone, so considering all of this, what actually happened? It seems more like a symbolic gesture.

Remember, the Iranians subsequently struck Bahrain, where our military installations are based. They warned us before doing so, and in fact, we had already evacuated personnel from Bahrain. Regarding whether Hezbollah sleeper cells exist in America, is that something to be concerned about? The FBI rounded up individuals and made arrests, so I think we probably know who they are. It’s tough to keep such activities concealed, especially since we have a large Iranian population in California.

Interestingly, you can’t buy a Ferrari in California without dealing with Iranians who own the dealerships. It’s somewhat of a joke: if you want a Ferrari, better speak Farsi! They definitely don’t sell immediately, either. I think we know where the Iranian population is focused. The other point is that Iran likely doesn’t want to act in a way that would worsen the current situation. This may change as the situation deteriorates—if more people die, they’re more likely to retaliate.

Colonel, what’s China’s angle here? What do you think they were doing behind the scenes? Or is it more prudent for them to wait, focusing on bigger objectives? The Chinese are akin to Donald Trump in that they don’t want war. Their perspective, aligned with Russia’s, is that if Iran is destroyed and regime change occurs, with a puppet government in place, they risk losing everything they aim to achieve commercially on the Eurasian landmass.

The Chinese depend heavily on Iranian oil and natural gas. They will work on alternative routes to avoid conflict arising from these. Both China and Russia have stated that they will not let Iran fail. Reports claim that China is providing Iran with a significant number of new fifth-generation aircraft. Some say this is because Iran and Russia have had a fallout, but that is not the case.

During a recent meeting of the Iranian and Russian foreign ministers after a devastating 12-day conflict, Putin highlighted an aspect of their alliance, expressing that they could have helped Iran protect its assets. The Iranians were reluctant to accept assistance for pride reasons. However, it’s clear that Putin conveyed to Iran they must consider cooperation during crises.

The Russians could easily supply them with multiple S-400 systems if necessary. I see that both Russia and China have committed not to let this state fail.

Colonel, you’ve mentioned that other countries might begin developing nuclear weapons—not for supremacy, but perhaps as deterrents against attacks or to gain leverage. Consider North Korea; they’ve given themselves a bargaining chip based on the potential use of their nuclear weapons. Recently, we heard media reports that North Korea was ready to ship nuclear weapons to Iran, a suggestion even made by a former Russian president, which Trump dismissed. What are your thoughts on this posturing, and which countries stand out in your mind?

I think President Netanyahu’s statement in the Oval Office was crucial. He chuckled while saying, “We want the Libya solution for Iran.” If we look back at the Libya case, it can be summed up by demanding that a country relinquishes its nuclear weapons and halting any biological or chemical activities. In return, you can rejoin the family of nations, sanctions will lift, flowers will bloom, peace will thrive, and so on. But we know what happened: they cooperated entirely, gave up their nuclear arsenal, and were subsequently killed horrifically.

That’s the scenario Netanyahu envisions for Iran. In the region, there are compelling motivations to develop a nuclear deterrent capable of unveiling at the right moment. People can easily understand the reasoning: if you do not submit to Israeli dominance and U.S. backing, you risk destruction by the air and missile power of the U.S. and Israel.

While I’m not advocating for nuclear proliferation, one must consider how North Korea has effectively demonstrated that having such weapons could ensure survival, particularly for regimes targeted by the West.

Colonel, what are the perspectives of the Saudis, Qataris, and Emirates regarding the ongoing situation? Iran has been viewed as a threat to them for decades; meanwhile, they are also invested in the Muslim populations of Gaza. Take into account all these factors—where do their allegiances lie? They also have to keep the Houthies in mind, who always pose challenges. Ultimately, what do these nations want in the region?

It’s important to remember that all these nations have significant Shiite minorities, which plays a critical role. Whenever Iran has been active in the region, its main focus has not been to destroy Israel, despite what the Israelis might suggest; it has aimed to protect the Shiite minorities. For example, Hezbollah is fundamentally a product of Israeli occupation, which is rarely mentioned.

Hamas was effectively created with Mr. Netanyahu’s assistance as a counterbalance to the Palestinian Liberation Authority. If you go to Saudi Arabia or the Emirates, you will find Shiites regarded as second-class citizens. In some instances, their treatment can be worse, akin to Russians in eastern Ukraine. Iranians aim to protect those individuals whenever possible, in which they’ve had success.

During my time in Saudi Arabia in 1990 and ’91, a senior Saudi officer joked that during artillery practice, they would fire rounds toward Shiite settlements for amusement, demonstrating a clear attitude towards them. I wouldn’t want to live in an environment like that, but it illustrates the prevailing mindset. There remains a persistent catalyst for conflict between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf.

As for the Gulf states, they absolutely do not want war—this is evident. These nations are among the most non-militant on Earth. All were formed as part of British imperialism. Before the British Empire’s arrival, the history was less than pleasant. It’s essential to recognize that these nations emerged due to Great Britain’s influence in the post-World War I era, when families were chosen to rule. They have endured a luxurious lifestyle due to the wealth they accumulated, much of which is stored in London.

Consequently, they seek to avoid conflict at all costs. They would prefer the path of least resistance, knowing that failing to do so jeopardizes their sovereignty due to the myriad forces present. In the Arabian Peninsula, many individuals harbor fears of the Turks, especially considering their recent resurgence.

Turkey, Iran, China, and India have all historically lagged behind the West for several centuries; however, this is no longer the case. They are now great powers in their own right, with rich histories, cultures, and civilizations that are unlikely to be disregarded. Thus, if you consider what it would take for a Turkish advance on Riyadh, it’s feasible they could accomplish it in just a few days.

Consequently, these states will align with anyone who promises to keep them in power and offer their protection. Up to this point, that role has transitioned from Great Britain to the United States. The premise is straightforward: if you want our assistance and cooperation, you must engage with Israel. That’s the crux of what Iran actively resists.

Finally, Colonel, the situation for Trump six months into his presidency is intriguing. At the year’s end, what steps do you think he should take? Notably, he could leverage the strike on Iran to promote his significant legislation, where foreign policy is interwoven with domestic objectives. Given your experience serving presidents, what are your thoughts on the actions he needs to ensure his agenda continues to progress?

Peace is indeed in everyone’s interest; however, no one seems to be addressing the elephant in the room: the soaring national debt. A prominent figure, Nasim Taleb, aptly noted that the new reserve currency is gold. The dollar can no longer serve as a reliable store of value. Our accumulated sovereign national debt, treated with disdain by everyone, has grown to a point of a metastasizing cancer endangering the stability of the nation.

When I worked with RFK Jr., I authored a paper that circulated within the Trump administration on foreign and defense policy, suggesting immediate cuts of 50% in military spending by repatriating forces from overseas. Technology has evolved; modern warfare features precision-guided munitions and missiles that potentially render conventional force structures obsolete.

We’ve learned from conflicts in Eastern Ukraine as well as the Israeli-Iranian war that our military’s framework, designed during World War II, is in dire need of reevaluation. Continuing to maintain this outdated military posture in a world dominated by rapid technological advancements poses risks we cannot afford to ignore.

Moreover, our meddling in Central Asia, attempting destabilization, needs an overhaul. Interfering in the South China Sea doesn’t concern us; those regions should resolve their disputes independently. Whenever U.S. representatives speak about a looming war threat from China, they meet with disbelief; no one in Asia is pursuing this conflict except the U.S. No one there desires conflict with China, and such notions are baseless.

That’s where President Trump shines; he knows that military engagement yields nothing beneficial. Unfortunately, he finds himself a prisoner of various influencing forces. As Elon Musk suggested, passing the ‘big beautiful bill’ could take us over the edge financially, and the timeline for this occurrence remains uncertain—perhaps it could happen at any moment.

Scott Bessent, the Secretary of the Treasury, is making strides to prevent the bond market from collapsing, while Jerome Powell is wrestling with interest rates he ultimately doesn’t control. The reality is interest rates take on a life of their own, exacerbating fears of a disaster looming over financial stability. The U.S. military’s changes and its withdrawal from overseas commitments will be entirely dictated by our financial standing—a budgetary crisis could lead to a paradigm shift, leaving most military efforts immobilized.